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Workforce Policy and Care Quality in English Long-term
Elder Care
Carol Atkinson , Sarah Crozier, and Rosemary Lucas
Manchester Metropolitan University Business School
ABSTRACT
In this article, we explore workforce policy and its potential to
improve care quality in English long-term elder care. Using
large, secondary sector datasets, we analyze relationships
between care quality and the skill development practices pre-
scribed by workforce policy, care quality, and a wider set of
employment practices. We demonstrate that the latter is more
likely to improve care quality than skill development alone.
We further demonstrate that both skill development/care qual-
ity and employment practice/care quality relationships are
stronger in the statutory than the independent sector. Our
findings challenge the effectiveness of workforce policy in two
ways. First, it may be too narrowly focused on skill develop-
ment at the expense of wider employment practice. Second, it
may not be effective in improving care quality when outsourc-
ing care ostensibly to improve it leads, particularly in the inde-
pendent sector, to cost-based commissioning that mitigates
against robust employment practice.
KEYWORDS
Care quality; employment;
social care
Increased life expectancy has created a global elderly population that is now
the largest in human history (UN, 2013). Demand for long-term elder care
has, in tandem, grown exponentially, with many neoliberal market econo-
mies adopting new public management (NPM) approaches to its delivery
(Nisbet, 2017). In essence, NPM promotes market-based mechanisms prem-
ised on private sector principles of efficiency and outcomes in delivery of
public services (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010). Accordingly, governments pur-
chase elder-care from the private or voluntary sectors using market mecha-
nisms that emphasize cost-control, competition, and quality (Nisbet, 2017).
In this article, we focus on long-term elder care in England, where it is
termed “adult social care” (ASC) and describes the provision of personal
care, protection, or social support to some of society’s most vulnerable adults
in either their own homes or residential facilities (Gray & Birrell, 2013).
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In England, in accordance with NPM principles, most ASC is funded by
the state and purchased by local authorities from the independent sector
(Means, 2012). This mirrors arrangements in the United States, where
around three quarters of long-term care services are funded by Medicaid
and other public sources, though delivered by largely private providers
(Nisbet, 2017). Similar policy approaches are evident in other neoliberal
regimes, such as Australia (Harley, Allen, & Sargent, 2007), Canada
(Cunningham, Baines, & Charlesworth, 2014), and Japan (Broadbent,
2014). However, there is growing recognition of NPM’s failure to deliver
high quality care, not least given budgetary constraints in austere times
(Nisbet, 2017). In England, claims abound of a crisis in ASC, amid a num-
ber of high-profile scandals over care failures (e.g., Kingsmill, 2014).
Dignity of older people is compromised, as is the effective operation of
hospital systems when insufficient, good-quality longer-term care is avail-
able (e.g., Wainwright, 2017).
In this article, we argue that lack of an adequate, skilled labor supply is
central to these care failures (Cavendish, 2013). The rapid growth in
demand for elder care noted above has been accompanied by increased
demand for care workers, termed “aides” in the United States (Nisbet,
2017). In a NPM regime, most are based in independent-sector organiza-
tions (Howes, 2014), where the state has limited control over employment
practice—how workers are recruited, paid, trained, and otherwise managed,
and its attempts to assure an adequate, skilled labor supply are at
arm’s length via policy interventions. In England, this policy has focused on
skills development (including induction, training, and vocational qualifica-
tions (e.g., DH, 2009; SfC, 2011)). This prioritizing of workforce develop-
ment reflects a government philosophy based on strategic human resource
management (SHRM) principles (Gospel & Lewis, 2011): good employment
practice is desirable both in its own right and because positive worker out-
comes benefit end-users via improved care quality (Bach & Kessler, 2011).
Yet SHRM advocates for a broad set of employment practice to deliver
these benefits, not simply workforce development, and in England policy is
silent on wider employment practice, which is often poor (Cunningham,
2008). For example, care workers are subject to low pay (Nisbet, 2017),
have insecure jobs, and lack working time flexibility (Rubery & Urwin,
2011). Far from a skilled and adequate labor supply, recruitment and reten-
tion of ASC workers in England are widely acknowledged to be “in crisis”
(Rubery et al., 2011), which calls workforce policy’s effectiveness into ques-
tion. We suggest that this is problematic for delivery of high quality care
and demonstrate here that, while policy-driven skills development has a
role to play in improving care quality, wider (good) employment practice
underpins better quality care. We further demonstrate significant variation
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in employment practice and care quality across the statutory and independ-
ent sectors.
Our research makes an important contribution in providing a unique
quantitative examination of employment practice/care quality relationships
in ASC, drawing our data from two English secondary ASC datasets. Our
findings lend support to existing research which demonstrates positive rela-
tionships between employment practice and care quality (Grimshaw et al.,
2015). Our study is situated in what is typically considered to be a low-
skilled sector (Rainbird et al., 2011) with basic employment practice
(Rubery et al., 2013) and delivery of minimum requirements rather than
more sophisticated practices, such as work-life balance. Its insights may
thus inform understanding of low-skilled work more generally, which is
important given its growth globally. Our analysis leads us to challenge the
effectiveness of workforce policy where it prescribes only skill development
and argue that, in remaining silent on wider employment practice, it is too
narrowly focused to effect the required improvements in care quality. We
further question NPM principles that suggest that commissioning of care
from the independent sector will improve its quality, particularly given the
implications of cost-based commissioning for employment practice in the
independent sector.
In what follows, we first discuss the English ASC context and then litera-
ture on employment practice, synthesizing these to establish our research
hypotheses. We next present our methods and findings before discussing
our research outcomes and drawing conclusions as to their implications for
the likely effectiveness of workforce policy in improving care quality.
The English ASC context
Since the 1980s, New Public Management (NPM) principles have domi-
nated public sector reform in many liberal market economies, including the
United States (Nisbet, 2017) and England (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010). State
provision of services has been reduced, replaced by more marketized forms
of relationship in which services are outsourced to the independent (both
private and voluntary) sector (Cunningham, 2008). The dominant logic
embraces a business model where commercial practices are presumed to be
more cost efficient and deliver better quality services (Schmid, 2003). In
England, local authorities purchase over 80% of ASC from the independent
sector (Cunningham et al., 2014), which comprises more than 40,000
mainly small, private, and voluntary sector organizations (Eborall et al.,
2010). During a long period of austerity and underfunding, however, the
commissioning process has been subject to much criticism (Kingsmill,
2014). For example, that commissioning is activity- rather than outcomes-
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based; that, as the major purchaser of older people’s care, local authorities
have created a monopsony which enables them to drive down pricing
(Cavendish, 2013); and that commissioning is more cost- than quality-
focused (UKHCA, 2012). This has had negative implications for care quality
and protection of vulnerable adults has emerged as a key concern for social
care policy and is prominent in regulatory frameworks (Means, 2012). This
has created a preoccupation with targets and audit (Hood & Dixon, 2013),
centered on the National Minimum Standards (NMS) of care delivery.
These were first introduced in the Care Standards Act (2000), later the
Health and Social Care Act (2008) and then the Care Act (2014), and con-
stitute an outcomes-based approach (Newman et al., 2008) that relies on
NMSs as intermediate quality indicators. The 38 NMSs assess patient
involvement and information, personalized care treatment and support,
safeguarding and safety, effective staffing and quality, and management.
They are audited by the Care Quality Commission (CQC, also established
by the 2000 Act) and inspection scores are afforded to all care providers.
As such, they provide an evaluation of care quality (Gospel & Lewis, 2011)
and inform service user choice (Bach & Kessler, 2011). While there is some
criticism of the bureaucratic nature of the NMS, they are the widely estab-
lished measure of long-term elder care quality in England.
As noted at the outset, efforts to assure high quality care are also deliv-
ered via workforce policy that promotes development and upskilling (e.g.,
Cavendish, 2013; Kingsmill, 2014). Policy is premised upon SHRM princi-
ples that advocate good employment practice as a means to achieve super-
ior performance (e.g., DH, 2009; SfC, 2011). Gospel and Lewis (2011,
p. 606) describe this approach as unique in British history:
One way of conceptualizing the “whole systems” approach introduced by the 2000
Act, therefore, is as an attempt to establish in the social care sector a high-skills
equilibrium, in which a well-trained workforce is managed by means of a
complementary set of HR practices so as to deliver high-quality care.
Here the whole systems approach refers to SHRM principles (explained
in more detail in the subsequent section) that combine synergistic sets of
employment practices for maximum performance benefits (Wright &
McMahon, 2011). Workforce policy addresses skill development practices
and exhorts (but does not regulate) the adoption of complementary practi-
ces such as high pay, secure employment, and flexible working in order to
create the adequate, skilled workforce essential for delivery of high-qual-
ity care.
Workforce policy is supported by Skills for Care (SfC, part of the Sector
Skills Council for social care in England), with emphasis on skill develop-
ment via a training and qualifications framework. This ensures both deliv-
ery of induction training, which has been mandatory since 2005 (SfC,
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2010), and support for achievement of (a minimum of) Level 2 vocational
qualifications (SfC/SfH, 2013), initially National Vocational Qualifications
and latterly Health and Social Care Diplomas. The Cavendish Review
(2013) continued this emphasis on skill development to improve care qual-
ity. Wider development initiatives have also included apprenticeships and
calls for career progression opportunities (Kingsmill, 2014).
As noted above, workforce policy prescribes only skill development prac-
tices (Gospel & Thompson, 2003), and does not address Gospel and Lewis’s
(2011) “complementary” employment practice. It simply notes the need for
commissioning practice that supports fair terms and conditions of employ-
ment (DH, 2009). Gray and Birrell (2013) question whether policy’s rhet-
oric on the need for a well-trained, skilled workforce can be effective in the
face of failure to prescribe wider employment practice. This is an important
issue not addressed in current ASC workforce research, and we shall return
to it later in developing our hypotheses.
Employment practice in ASC
Here we briefly discuss SHRM principles, the theoretical basis for presum-
ing that good employment practice will be associated with high care quality.
These principles support the employment practices and performance meas-
ures included in this study and we synthesize these with research on the
ASC workforce to establish our hypotheses. SHRM posits that workers pro-
vide the mechanism for sustained competitive advantage and superior
organizational performance (Wright & McMahon, 2011), here, high-quality
care. This is premised on a mutual gains scenario in which good employ-
ment practice promotes and reconciles organizational and worker interests
and creates performance benefits for both (Avgar et al., 2011). The link
between employment practice and organizational performance has been
researched extensively with increasing acceptance of the relationship, as
explored in a recent special issue of Human Resource Management Journal
(Boxall et al., 2016), an academic journal presenting high quality employ-
ment research. SHRM underpins policy’s prioritizing of investment in
workforce development (Newman et al., 2008) and reflects government
philosophy across both the health and social care sectors that good treat-
ment of workers is desirable both in its own right and because positive
worker outcomes benefit end-users via improved care quality (Bach &
Kessler, 2011).
While SHRM is premised on the application of a synergistic set of
employment practices, there is debate over what constitutes the set (Boxall
et al., 2016). We adopt policy’s premise that certain (skill development)
practices will be performance enhancing (DH, 2009). We also follow Gospel
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and Lewis (2011) who suggest that “complementary HR practices” are
required as part of the whole systems approach, necessitating a decision as
to which to include. Training and development, employment security and
internal labour markets and pay are typically included in SHRM sets of
employment practices (Harley et al., 2007). More recent studies have also
included flexibility and performance management (Boxall & Macky, 2007)
and, as we note above, career development is important in ASC
(Cavendish, 2013). In our analysis, we added the complementary employ-
ment practices of pay, employment security, and flexibility to skill develop-
ment. Secondary dataset constraints prevented inclusion of performance
appraisal and career development. Nevertheless, we argue that our set
includes most of the typical complementary practices and provides a robust
basis for analysis of employment practice/care quality relationships. There
is, however, currently limited SHRM research in low-pay, low-skilled ser-
vice sectors, such as ASC (Batt & Banerjee, 2012), and Batt (2002) argues
that SHRM principles are most effective in high-value sectors where skilled
workers engage in complex service provision. Similar outcomes may not be
achieved in jobs that are low-skilled, routine, and unrewarding (Berg &
Frost, 2005), and employment practice is basic (Rubery et al., 2015). There
is little recognition of these constraints in either policy documents (Rubery
& Urwin, 2011) or government-commissioned reviews (e.g., Cavendish,
2013). Yet context-appropriate, even if basic, employment practice can
benefit workers. For example, ASC workers may welcome opportunities to
acquire (low-level) vocational qualifications, given the gendered and typic-
ally poorly educated nature of the workforce (Kaine, 2012). Further, ASC
work does not fully reflect the conventional characterizations of low-skilled
service work (Rainbird et al., 2011): it is complex and relational in nature,
which may create a greater propensity for employment practice to influence
care quality (Hussein et al., 2009). Our research creates an important evi-
dence base and we now consider the ASC research base for our employ-
ment practices.
In ASC, workforce policy prescribes induction training and acquisition of
vocational qualifications (hereafter, “prescribed practice”). We adopt these,
as is typical, as proxies for skill development (Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2011).
Since 2005, all newly appointed care workers have been required to under-
take induction training (SfC, 2010). All care workers also have to work
toward Health and Social Care Diplomas Level 2 (initially, National
Vocational Qualifications Level 2) or equivalent. Half of all care workers in
any care provider must hold this qualification (DH, 2009). This requires a
marked shift from 2000, when 80% of the social care workforce had no
qualifications (Gospel & Lewis, 2011). There is thus heavy reliance on
induction and vocational qualifications as mechanisms to upskill the
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workforce. The effectiveness of vocational qualifications, however, may be
questionable as their competence focus may simply lead to accreditation of
existing behaviors (Grugulis, 2003). Level 2 is also modest, equating to
school-leaving qualification at age 16 in England (Cameron & Phillips,
2003). Gospel and Lewis (2011), however, present findings that post-date
changes intended to deliver greater rigor in vocational qualifications and
suggest that they can be a genuine vehicle for skill development. Other
work also links acquisition of qualifications to care quality (Eborall, 2011).
Following SHRM theory, despite somewhat limited sectoral evidence, work-
force policy is thus predicated upon an assumption that skills development
improves care quality.
In line with Gospel and Lewis’s (2011) “whole systems” approach and
wider strategic HRM principles (Wright & McMahon, 2011), complemen-
tary employment practice (hereafter, “complementary practice”) is also cen-
tral to improving care quality. The sector’s capacity to deliver effective
complementary practice is, however, questionable particularly given its
weak regulation (Kingsmill, 2014). Pay rates reflect the National Minimum
Wage (NMW) or less (Bessa et al., 2013), and are suppressed by commis-
sioning processes. For example, local authorities rates do not allow payment
for time spent in training, and recent confirmation that domiciliary care
workers should be paid for traveling time has been largely ignored (Unison,
2014). Nonstandard employment relationships also prevail with the wide-
spread use of zero-hour and other insecure contracts (Rubery et al., 2015),
and working time flexibility for worker benefit (e.g., term-time only or
compressed working weeks) is limited with a poor work/home equilibrium
(Rubery & Urwin, 2011). As Kingsmill (2014, p. 9) notes, “poor working
conditions often go hand in hand with poor quality of care.” There may
then be limited optimism that level of complementary practice needed to
improve care quality exists.
Allied to employment practice are other sector outcomes that influence
care quality. Here we consider recruitment, retention, and Investor-in-
People accreditation. As we noted at the outset, recruitment and retention
are problematic in ASC. Recruitment difficulties can be measured via num-
ber of vacancies in the sector (CFWI, 2011) and retention via labor turn-
over figures (Eborall et al., 2010). Both are influenced by employment
practice (Rubery et al., 2011), for example, training and flexibility reduce
labor turnover (Avgar et al., 2011; CFWI, 2011; Selden et al., 2013), and
low pay increases turnover and vacancy levels (Cavendish, 2013). In respect
of labor turnover and vacancies, we might expect negative relationships
between these measures and care quality (Avgar et al., 2011), particularly
given their negative impact on care continuity (Eborall et al., 2010): the
care worker from whom an older person receives care may be subject to
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constant change. Investors in People (IIP) is a UK scheme which evaluates
whether an organization adopts a strategic approach to managing training
(Rainbird et al., 2011). “IIP-recognized” refers to accredited organizations
and might be expected to result from adoption of workforce policy. Given
IIP’s aim to improve performance nationally (Stewart & Sambrook, 2012), a
positive relationship might be expected between IIP-recognition and care
quality, although we note criticisms of its bureaucratic emphasis and lack of
impact on skill development (Grugulis & Bevitt, 2002).
Our research explores relationships between care quality and both
employment practice (prescribed and complementary) and recruitment,
retention, and IIP-status. This raises the question of how to assess care
quality as, in SHRM research, performance measures vary and typically
include profit, turnover, and market share. Yet in small, independent ASC
providers, these data are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, and do not,
in any case, directly address the elder person’s experience. As outlined ear-
lier, in England care quality is evaluated via a set of National Minimum
Standards (NMS) (Gospel & Lewis, 2011) and CQC inspection outcomes
against these are made available publicly to inform service user choice
(Bach & Kessler, 2011). We use the NMS data to measure care quality and
performance against these should, in line with SHRM theory, improve
where care workers are well-trained, fairly paid, have secure employment,
access to flexible working, where vacancies and turnover are low, and IIP-
recognition is secured.
Drawing on the above, we hypothesize:
H1: Higher uptake of prescribed practices (induction training and vocational
qualifications) together with more positive recruitment, retention, and IIP-status
outcomes will significantly predict higher NMS scores.
H2: Higher uptake of prescribed practices plus better complementary practices (pay,
employment status, and flexibility) together with more positive recruitment, retention,
and IIP-status outcomes will significantly predict greater higher NMS scores than
prescribed practices alone.
We also explore sectoral effects. While most ASC has been outsourced to
the private and voluntary sectors, a small proportion continues to be deliv-
ered in the statutory sector where more favorable employment practice is
applied by the state as a model employer (Gould Williams, 2004). This
stands in stark contrast to the independent sector where commissioning
processes have delivered inadequate and insecure funding and exerted
downwards pressure on terms and conditions (Rubery et al., 2013), driving
a “race to the bottom” (Cunningham, 2008, p. 1033). As already noted, pay
is low and employment insecure. Independent care providers’ primary con-
cern is to ensure regulatory compliance rather than adopting SHRM princi-
ples to embed employment practice that serves to improve care quality
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(Rubery et al., 2013). While it should be noted that cost pressures are also
experienced in the statutory sector (Rubery et al., 2013), their dominance in
the independent sector means that NPM’s rhetoric of delivering improved
care quality via its independent sector provision has not translated
in practice.
We hypothesize:
H3: There will be higher uptake of prescribed practices (induction training and
vocational qualifications) and more favorable recruitment, retention, and IIP-status
outcomes that significantly predict higher NMS scores in the statutory sector compared
to the private and voluntary sectors.
H4: There will be higher uptake of prescribed practices plus better complementary
practices (pay, employment status, and flexibility) and more favorable recruitment,
retention, and IIP-status outcomes that significantly predict higher NMS scores than
prescribed practices alone in the statutory sector compared to the private and
voluntary sectors.
Methods and data
Our analysis draws on two secondary quantitative ASC datasets: the SfC
National Minimum Dataset-Social Care (NMDS-SC) and a Care Quality
Commission (CQC) dataset of inspection scores against the Older People
National Minimum Standards (NMS) of care quality. NMDS-SC provides
an information base on employment practice and outcomes for the little-
understood ASC sector. Care-providing organizations enter data online into
the NMDS-SC, and completion rates are in excess of 50% of providers
(CfWI, 2011). The NMDS-SC comprises two data subsets: organization data
and individual worker data. Organization data include variables that meas-
ure type of establishment; IIP status; number of staff; number of vacancies
and number of staff ceasing employment. Individual worker data include
individual demographic information; job demographic information includ-
ing pay and benefits; employment and working arrangements; and induc-
tion training and qualification status. We integrated the organization and
worker subsets in SPSS, aggregating individual worker data to organization
level. We focused our analyses on care workers and senior care workers, as
this is the largest group and the primary focus of workforce policy. Our
sample was further limited to those working in residential care/nursing
homes and domiciliary care agencies providing services to older people, as
care of older people is our particular interest—and is also the most com-
plete data category. The CQC dataset records inspection outcome scores
against NMS indicators for all CQC-registered care providers. Linking
organizations via a unique identifier, we merged the composite NMDS-SC
dataset with the CQC dataset in SPSS. Where significant data was missing
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at worker level when merged, listwise deletion was favored over imputation
techniques, drawing on Allison (2014), who suggests that listwise deletion
can have particular benefits over imputation techniques especially with a
large sample where the statistical power for the inferential tests is not com-
promised. Typically, listwise deletion proceeds only if data are missing at
random and thereby provides a representative sample. The final dataset
comprised 4,384 organizations from a total of 17,763 and 134,000 individu-
als from a total of 370,063. We provide an overview of sector and size for
the original versus final dataset (see Table 1) illustrating that the propor-
tions are broadly comparable across both, albeit medium-sized firms are
somewhat overrepresented after listwise deletion.
However, recent research has suggested that factors other than represen-
tativeness are important (Bartlett et al., 2014). Allison (2014) and Bartlett
et al. (2014) argue that for regression testing, if data are missing on pre-
dictor variables rather than the dependent variable then listwise deletion
can produce less biased results than imputation techniques. In our data, all
establishments had an NMS score, so missing data were evident at the pre-
dictor level and not the dependent variable level, thereby making it an
appropriate methodology.
We note the complexities of working with large, secondary datasets
where data is subject to interpretation in data filtering and cleaning
(Bollier, 2012), and we explore associated limitations below. We argue here,
however, that the insights offered by analysis of this unique dataset are
valuable in developing understanding of employment practice/care quality
relationships in ASC.
Variables and measures
The datasets offered objective measures which are recommended over sub-
jective ones (Whyman et al., 2015). We recoded data into categorical variables
other than pay (a continuous scale) to meet the criteria for linear hierarchical
regression analysis (Cohen et al., 2003). Employment practices constitute the
first independent variables in our model and are drawn from individual
worker NMDS-SC data (an analytical file user guide is available at https://
www.nmds-sc-online.org.uk/research). The five variables comprise induction
training; vocational qualifications (prescribed practices); employment status;
Table 1. Size of establishment by sector.
Full data set (%) Post listwise deletion (%)
Statutory Private Voluntary Statutory Private Voluntary
1–49 86.4 83.1 87.4 70.0 63.0 54.1
50–259 12.7 16.4 12.1 30 36.9 45.9
250þ 0.9 0.5 0.5 0 0.1 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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flexible working; and average hourly pay (complementary practices). Where
the raw data was multicategorical, we recoded it into dichotomous variables
using binary coding so that variables were comparable and weighted consist-
ently. For “‘induction training,” we excluded the 25% of the sample who
responded n/a, having been in post prior to its becoming mandatory in 2005
and coded 0¼ in progress, 1¼ completed. For vocational qualifications, we
grouped NVQ2/3 together and coded 0¼ not recorded, 1¼ completed
NVQ2/3. For employment status, we grouped “temporary/casual” and “bank”
and “other” together and coded 0¼ nonpermanent, 1¼ permanent. For flexi-
bility, we grouped practices offered for worker-benefit, e.g., flextime, term-
time only, vacation only, home working, and compressed the working week
(and excluded zero hours which is for employer-benefit), and coded 0¼ no
flexibility, 1¼ flexibility. Use of dichotomous variables met the requirements
for linear regression analysis in that codes became numerically directional (e.
g., YES to provision of flexible working was “better” than NO; completing
qualifications was “better” than not).
Recruitment, retention, and IIP-status constitute the second independent
variables and are drawn from organizational NMDS-SC data. The three vari-
ables comprise: IIP status (dichotomous variable, 0¼ not IIP recognized,
1¼ IIP recognized); labor turnover (categorical 1–5 scale; reverse coded); and
vacancies (categorical 1–5 scale; reverse coded). For labor turnover and
vacancies, original categories that represented a range of responses (e.g., 1–3
vacancies, 4–6 vacancies etc.) were reverse recoded on a categorical scale
from 1 to 5, so a score of 5 represents the lowest category of vacancies and
labor turnover.
The dependent variable is care quality using NMS score from the CQC
dataset (1–4 scale; 1¼ standards “not met” to 4¼ standards “exceeded”).
An aggregate mean of NMS scores was derived by combining each of the
38 separate Older People performance indicators, which were equally
weighted, as reflecting their usage by CQC inspection regimes. A
Cronbach’s a of 0.74 reliability coefficient was satisfactory. All variables
underwent tests of assumption to meet the criteria for linear regression
analyses. Any variables that violated these assumptions were log-trans-
formed (Emerson, 1983). This applied to age (a control variable), average
hourly pay, and NMS performance. Log transformation seeks to reduce the
degree of skewness and eliminate extreme outliers in order to normalize
errors. This type of centering and scaling is commonplace before regression
takes place and reduces the potential for multicollinearity (Keene, 2005).
Analyses and results
The descriptive statistics reflect a mixed picture of employment practice
(Table 2). Ninety percent of workers had completed induction training with
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broadly similar patterns across all sectors. Less than 30% held NVQ2/3, and
qualification rates were highest in the private sector. Seventy percent were
working toward NVQ2/3, which may reflect substantial labor turnover
(Kingsmill, 2014). The basic average hourly pay rate was higher than the
NMW rate but low compared to median pay rates (LPC, 2010). Voluntary
sector averages were highest, statutory lowest, and those holding NVQ3
earned 28p per hour more than workers holding NVQ2, evidencing some
skill/pay links (pace Rubery & Urwin, 2011). The overwhelming majority
were permanently employed, the highest levels being in the private sector.
This does not depict highly insecure employment conditions, although
organizations may have favored permanent workers in NMDS-SC comple-
tions. Flexible working was limited, albeit most widely available in the
statutory sector. In summary, induction training and employment security
were evidenced, but NVQ acquisition and pay were low and flexibility lim-
ited. There were some variations in these patterns by sector but these were
not consistent, and no particular sector performed better than another
across most or all employment practices.
We conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses, which are most
suitable to our continuous and categorical/dichotomous predictor/inde-
pendent variables and continuous dependent variable and allowed us to
explore direction of influence. Correlations between the variables were
largely significant (Table 3).
The results of two hierarchical regression models were also significant
(Tables 4 and 5). All analyses controlled for gender, age, size of organiza-
tion at step one. Data were then entered into the model in line with our
hypotheses. All variables entered into regression analyses were assessed for
multicollinearity, and results indicated regression could proceed; that is,
none of our included variables was excluded from the analysis on the
grounds of multicollinearity.
Model 1 comprised only induction and qualifications; Model 2 comprised
all employment practices. This allowed for comparison of the impact of
only skill development compared to a wider group of employment practices
on care quality. We added in recruitment, retention, and IIP-status in both
models at step 3 to additionally assess their influence on NMS score.
Separate analysis for statutory, private, and voluntary sectors was also con-
ducted for each model.
Model 1 evidenced significant relationships between both induction and
qualifications independently and all employment practices combined with
recruitment, retention, IIP-status, and NMS score (Table 4). Significant
models for the sample as a whole emerge along with significant models for
each sector. For the regression analysis with all sectors included, a signifi-
cant model emerged with a statistically significant change in R2 between
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each step, accounting for 4% of the variance at step three. Statistical vari-
ance in this context refers to the variance in the regression model. Analysis
of variance is used in regression to help account for a fluctuation (vari-
ation) in an outcome variable, in this case our NMS scores, as a function of
the influence of our predictor/independent variables. Variance as a statis-
tical notion here accounts for how far a set of numbers are spread out
from their average (mean). In our regression, the adjusted R2 is the meas-
ure of variance in the model. Given that the models are significant, we can
assert that the reported adjusted R2s reflect the percentage of variance in
NMS score as a product of our predictor variables (Achen, 1982). Variance
differed, however, across the individual models. A Chow test (following the
UNIANOVA procedure in SPSS) was conducted to assess whether the dif-
ferences in R2 across sectors were significant. A significant result emerged
(F¼ 993.8, df¼ 1, p< 0.001) indicating that sectoral differences in R2 for
our models were apparent. For the statutory sector, a much higher propor-
tion of the variance in NMS performance score was identified in the final
step of the model (24%). Similarly, for the voluntary sector, 9% of the vari-
ance was accounted for and the private sector analysis accounted for 5% of
the variance. Hypotheses H1 and H3 are supported.
Model 2 evidenced significant relationships between both prescribed and
complementary practice independently and prescribed practice and comple-
mentary practice combined with recruitment, retention, IIP-status, and
Table 4. Hierarchical regression analyses: Development practices only (Model 1).
All Sectors Sector¼ Statutory Sector¼ Private Sector¼ Voluntary
Step 1 (Controls)
Gender 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.019
Age 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.011
Size of establishment 0.183 0.142 0.086 0.764
R2 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.081
F 271.081 16.216 212.142 131.593
Step 2 (Development practices)
Qualifications 0.042 0.014 0.044 0.048
Induction training 0.043 0.385 0.033 0.033
R2 0.029 0.173 0.029 0.084
DR2 0.004 0.147 0.003 0.003
F 211.061 75.503 160.568 91.236
Step 3 (Proximal performance measures)
IIP status 0.097 0.093 0.084 0.075
Vacancies 0.075 0.166 0.119 0.020
Labor turnover 0.031 0.239 0.078 0.059
R2 0.043 0.241 0.052 0.093
DR2 0.014 0.068 0.023 0.009
F 212.905 78.125 199.104 68.243
n 134506 12204 103378 18924
Notes: Reporting the standardized beta coefficient. Standard errors available upon request.p< 0.001, p< 0.01, p< 0.05. Note that R2 at each step is incremental and only the additional variables
included at each step are reported.
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NMS score (Table 5). Significant models for the sample as a whole again
emerge plus significant models for sector. For the regression analysis with
all sectors included, a significant model emerged with a statistically signifi-
cant change in R2 between each step, accounting for 4% of the variance at
step three. For the statutory sector however, a much higher proportion of
the variance in NMS performance score was identified in the final step of
the model (55%). Similarly, for the voluntary sector, 30% of the variance
was accounted for and the private sector analysis accounted for 6% of the
variance. Hypotheses H2 and H4 are supported.
In terms of the individual predictors within each step, there is a relatively
consistent pattern in the overall results. For induction and qualifications
only and for all employment practices, all variables have a significant and
(mainly) positive impact on NMS scores. The exceptions are employment
status and labor turnover in the second model which are significantly but
negatively related to the NMS score. The patterns are, however, more com-
plex by individual sector and we discuss these further below. Here, we note
that nonsignificant predictors by sector comprise: qualifications for the
statutory (b¼ 0.008, p> 0.05) and voluntary (b¼ 0.032, p> 0.05) sectors;
flexible working for the statutory sector (b ¼ 0.059, p> 0.05); employment
status for the private sector (b¼0.001, p> 0.05); and IIP status for the
voluntary sector (b¼ 0.27, p> 0.05).
Table 5. Hierarchical regression analyses: All employment practices (Model 2).
All sectors Sector¼ Statutory Sector¼ Private Sector¼ Voluntary
Step 1 (Controls)
Gender 0.040 0.073 0.044 0.033
Age 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.009
Size of establishment 0.177 1.671 0.027 1.073
R2 0.014 0.165 0.020 0.195
F 60.628 24.588 67.477 146.558
Step 2 (Employment practices)
Pay 0.024 0.265 0.020 0.261
Qualifications 0.020 0.008 0.025 0.032
Induction training 0.059 0.402 0.038 0.038
Flexible working 0.031 0.059 0.029 0.094
Employment status 0.015 0.083 0.001 0.036
R2 0.020 0.484 0.023 0.263
DR2 0.006 0.322 0.004 0.069
F 37.961 50.810 35.508 96.306
Step 3 (Proximal performance measures)
IIP status 0.068 0.065 0.074 0.27
Vacancies 0.140 0.183 0.192 0.208
Labor turnover 0.041 0.287 0.061 0.049
R2 0.043 0.548 0.064 0.299
DR2 0.024 0.065 0.041 0.037
F 63.607 49.150 75.543 86.402
n 134506 12204 103378 18924
Notes: Reporting the standardized beta coefficient. Standard errors available upon request.p< 0.001, p< 0.01, p< 0.05. Note that R2 at each step is incremental and only the additional variables
included at each step are reported.
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Before proceeding to discussion of significant findings, we acknowledge a
number of limitations of our work. There were two particular concerns in
respect of the secondary datasets: first, we had no control over data collec-
tion, entry, or quality; second, our analysis is constrained by the variables,
and some typical SHRM practices are missing. Yet we used respected sector
datasets (CfWI, 2011), which gave us “the capacity to collect and analyze
data with an unprecedented breadth and depth and scale” (Lazer et al.,
2009, p. 722). We have followed others who have used and aggregated pub-
lic data that are available relatively quickly after collection (e.g., Avgar
et al., 2011). We argue for the likely robustness of the data given its wide-
spread adoption in modeling the sector:
The current [NMDS-SC] coverage allows for generalisation following sampling, and
in workforce planning terms can provide excellent information about services, their
capacity, worker demographics and current levels of skill mix (CfWI, 2011, p. 3).
Finally, we recognize that adopting CQC inspection data as a measure of
organizational performance may be contested. Nevertheless, these inspec-
tion data provide a national measure of care quality (Gospel & Lewis, 2011)
which is intended to inform service user choice (Bach & Kessler, 2011).
Despite inevitable limitations, we argue that our research presents a novel
and insightful analysis of employment practice and care quality in ASC.
Discussion
Here we discuss the significant regression findings and examine our mod-
els’ collective worth in assessing the impact of employment practices on
care quality. We consider first prescribed practices contained in both
regression models, induction training, and vocational qualifications. Our
analysis indicates a mainly positive all-sector relationship between these
skill development practices and care quality. There were high levels of
engagement with induction training and, in the statutory and private sec-
tors, significant positive relationships with NMS score. This suggests policy
is appropriate in prescribing induction training that supports skill develop-
ment and improves performance (Stewart & Sambrook, 2012). Vocational
qualification acquisition was much lower, at around 30%, but positive rela-
tionships to NMS score across all sectors were evident. Workforce policy
premised on vocational qualifications appears to drive skill development
(Gospel & Lewis, 2011) and thus has potential to improve care quality.
However, their low acquisition undermines this and suggests that relatively
little progress in workforce upskilling has been made since the 2000 Act.
Policy, however effectively designed, may be compromised by poor imple-
mentation, which calls into question skills initiatives at the individual level
as a mechanism to deliver improved performance (Keep & Mayhew, 2010).
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Turning to complementary practices, all-sector relationships were again
positive and significant for pay and flexibility, though negative and signifi-
cant for employment status. Taking first employment status, there were
high levels of permanent employment and little evidence of instability (con-
tra Grimshaw & Carroll, 2002). Employment status was, however, signifi-
cantly and negatively related to care quality at both all-sector and statutory
sector levels. One possible explanation is that workers on insecure contracts
strove to do well to gain permanent employment. Future research should
investigate this further. Second, pay was low (Eborall et al., 2010) yet sig-
nificantly positively predictive of NMS score (other than in the statutory
sector) and higher pay was associated with better care outcomes. Finally,
flexible working across all sectors was significantly positively predictive of
NMS scores (per Avgar et al., 2011). This presents an opportunity, given its
limited offer. In summary, complementary practices were mainly signifi-
cantly and positively related to NMS score at the all-sector level, despite
some mixed sectoral patterns that require further exploration. This may
challenge workforce policy’s narrow focus on skill development: both higher
pay and better working-time flexibility appear to improve care quality but,
in the absence of associated policy or regulation, few care providers offer
employment practice to reap these benefits.
Our analysis further explored the impact of employment practice and
recruitment, retention and IIP-status in combination on the NMS score.
For the most part, their addition had a positive and significant impact.
Taking first IIP, there was a significant and positive impact at the all-sector
level that suggests that it leads to performance improvements (Stewart &
Sambrook, 2012). IIP-recognition varied widely across sectors, however,
and had a positive and significant impact only in the private sector. This
may indicate that it is a key differentiator here as few private care providers
are IIP-recognized. Given that fewer than 40% of all organizations were
IIP-recognized, this could be a worthwhile future focus for workforce pol-
icy. Second, labor turnover had a significant positive relationship to the
NMS score in Model 1 but not Model 2, which is inconsistent and requires
further exploration. Finally, vacancies evidenced consistent significant rela-
tionships to NMS score: fewer vacancies drives higher care quality. Effective
employment practice appears to be central to securing these performance
gains (Avgar et al., 2011).
Finally, we consider the explanatory properties of our regression models.
Prescribed practices significantly predict NMS score (Model 1). However,
prescribed and complementary practices in combination (Model 2) explain
a greater proportion of variance in NMS score than prescribed practices
alone. This appears to counter arguments that employment practice/quality
relationships do not hold in low-skilled sectors (Batt, 2002). The proportion
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of variance explained increases from Model 1 to 2 at both the all-sector
and individual sector level which is a powerful finding: wider employment
practice appears to be more effective in improving care quality than skill
development alone. In summary, our findings provide support for ASC pol-
icy’s emphasis on skill development but demonstrate that this is, in isola-
tion, less effective than a wider set of employment practices.
In terms of sectoral variation, our findings are equally powerful. While
both models are significant across all sectors, the proportion of variance
explained is relatively small (around 4%). The variances differ markedly by
sector, however, with Model 2 explaining 55% of the variance in the statu-
tory sector and 30% and 6% in the voluntary and private sectors respect-
ively. Similar patterns are seen, though with more modest variances, in
Model 1. While the findings are complex, the cost-driven commissioning of
outsourced care may offer an explanation. The negative implications of
commissioning for employment practice have been identified in both the
private (Rubery et al., 2013) and voluntary sectors (Cunningham, 2008;
Grimshaw et al., 2015), while the statutory sector retains (to some extent)
public-sector terms and conditions. Independent providers may focus on
compliance with prescribed practices rather than their adoption to improve
care quality (Rubery et al., 2013). More robust practice here may reap the
rewards of better care quality. Yet our findings support the assertion of
Cunningham et al. (2014) that NPM’s emphasis on cost-saving via inde-
pendent sector commissioning renders unlikely good employment practice
across ASC (Rubery et al., 2013). This appears to run counter to workforce
policy’s aim of improving care quality.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate that good employment practice in ASC is somewhat
limited, albeit perhaps more prevalent than much sector research suggests
(Rubery & Urwin, 2011). However, as SHRM theory would lead us to
expect (Wright & McMahon, 2011), where good practice exists, clear rela-
tionships are evidenced with improved care quality: skill development is
significantly predictive of better care quality and this improves further
when combined with complementary employment practice. Our findings
have important implications in providing support for a workforce policy
framework predicated on skill development to deliver workforce investment
and ensure high quality care (DH, 2009), notwithstanding the basic level of
such skill development (Cameron & Phillips, 2003). Yet acquisition of voca-
tional qualifications remains low, which could relate to funding constraints
(Jones, 2014), and high levels of labor turnover that mean that many care
workers start but relatively few complete these qualifications. This
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challenges the extent to which skill development can deliver substantial
improvements in care quality. Our findings also indicate a clear role for
complementary employment practice in improving care quality, yet call
into question the capacity of ASC providers to deliver a “whole systems
approach” (Gospel & Lewis, 2011, p. 606). Our findings suggest that work-
force policy needs both to be more widely drawn to address complementary
employment practice and more effectively implemented to ensure wide
uptake. Further, our findings demonstrate that employment practice/care
quality relationships are stronger in the statutory than the independent sec-
tor. This may result from outsourcing and commissioning practice: the
statutory sector retains, to some extent, better employment practice than
the independent sector. Here, cost pressures mitigate against adoption of
good complementary practice (Cunningham et al., 2014) and prescribed
practice may simply become another requirement within a cost-driven sys-
tem rather than an opportunity to create a high performance workplace
(Rubery et al., 2013).
Our research makes an important contribution to understanding employ-
ment practice/care quality relationships in ASC. Current workforce policy
(DH, 2009) and reviews aimed at improving care quality (Cavendish, 2013;
Kingsmill, 2014) lack a robust evidence base. In demonstrating positive
employment practice/care quality relationships, we provide support for
workforce policy’s premise in SHRM that investment in people provides the
basis for enhanced performance (Wright & McMahon, 2011). While this
has been largely established in high-skilled, high-wage sectors (Boxall et al.,
2016), its effectiveness in low-skilled, low-wage sectors that compete on
cost has been questioned (Batt & Banerjee, 2012). Our findings give
grounds for optimism that good employment practice positively influences
care quality, even where pay and skill levels are (relatively) low (contra
Batt, 2002). This has wider implications given the growth of low-skilled
work both nationally and internationally. It may, however, be that ASC is
not a typical low-skilled sector (Rainbird et al., 2011) and that its relational
nature supports investment in workers being repaid by better care delivery.
Further research is required to explore the likelihood of positive outcomes
from workforce investment in more typical low-skilled sectors.
Our analysis calls into question the effectiveness of workforce policy in
enhancing care quality. Workforce policy is heavily reliant on induction
training and vocational qualifications as up-skilling mechanisms. While we
demonstrate that both enhance care quality, we do not evidence, despite
regulation, high levels of vocational qualification acquisition. Increased
funding and a more stable workforce is required to enable regulation to
succeed in creating the skilled labor supply essential to high quality care.
Yet workforce policy focuses primarily on skill development as a panacea to
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improved care quality (e.g., the National Minimum Training Standards,
SfC/SfH, 2013), and is supported in this by national reviews of ASC quality
(Cavendish, 2013; Kingsmill, 2014). We argue that policy’s focus on skill
development is too narrow, given our findings that wider employment
practice more effectively enhances care quality. However regulation is weak
(Kingsmill, 2014), and given the external commissioning of ASC provision,
workforce policy can only encourage independent providers to deliver fair
terms and conditions of employment (DH, 2009). Underfunding and cost-
based commissioning mitigate against this (Cunningham, 2008; Grimshaw
et al., 2015). However, there is increasing recognition of the need for better
complementary employment practice. Kingsmill (2014), for example, argues
for enforcement of NMW and the banning of zero-hours contracts.
Cavendish (2013) suggests payment of the living wage and better career
pathways. Yet both stop short of calling for regulation, with Kingsmill
(2014) simply arguing for CQC inspection to enforce current legal mini-
mums and prevent the worst excesses of exploitation. We argue that more
widely drawn, rigorous workforce policy that supports uptake of current
prescribed practices and includes complementary employment practice to
support these is required to substantially improve care quality.
Finally, our analysis evidences the implications of NPM regimes for care
quality and offers support to Knapp et al. (2001), who have argued that the
success of English social care policy in enhancing care quality may be
inhibited by market-like arrangements. Indeed, we demonstrate more posi-
tive outcomes in the statutory than the independent sector. External service
provision does not always achieve the envisaged improvements (Schmid,
2003; Kordasiewicz & Sadura, 2016), and when care is delivered in the
independent sector, cost-based commissioning mitigates against good
employment practice (Cunningham et al., 2014; Grimshaw et al., 2015) and
ultimately care quality. Yet in a policy context in which neoliberal princi-
ples are deeply embedded, we do not envisage a move away from NPM,
market-based approaches, and a return to the statutory provision of ASC.
Then how can care quality be improved? To reduce a cost emphasis,
Cavendish (2013) recommends a shift to local authority commissioning
based on outcomes rather than activities. We argue that this, alone, is
unlikely to be sufficient in the face of public sector financial constraints
and associated Local Authority budget cuts. We support Kingsmill (2014)
in calling for better funding of ASC and the integration of health and social
care budgets. While complex, combining health and social care could both
achieve financial efficiencies and (crucially) lead to care work being more
highly valued in the longer term. It could also throw into sharp relief differ-
ing regulatory/policy approaches across the two sectors and bring pressure
to bear for better terms and conditions in ASC. As we note above, this
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should be supported by regulation of complementary employment practice:
additional funding alone is insufficient, as Grimshaw et al. (2015) recently
evidenced that in a market-based regime, only 14p of every extra pound
spent went to improve care worker pay. Regulation is necessary to ensure
that any funding increases flow to where needed: improvement of care
worker terms and conditions. We acknowledge the potential cost of this
and the complexity of demonstrating return given the difficulty of attaching
a financial value to care quality. However, we argue that the benefits of dig-
nity for the elderly, a better employment deal for care workers that sup-
ports their recruitment and retention, and a more effective health system
not overwhelmed by the demands of elder-care that could be better met
elsewhere justify the cost of increased regulation that delivers better
employment practice.
Our research has important implications for practitioners that run coun-
ter to some who currently argue that SHRM approaches will not be effect-
ive in low-skilled sectors (Batt, 2002). We demonstrate that good
employment practice improves performance outcomes—here, care quality.
Social care providers should design and deliver employment practice that
attracts, develops, and retains the required skilled ASC workforce, affording
particular attention to development, pay, employment security, and work-
life balance.
In conclusion, workforce policy’s effectiveness in delivering improved
care quality is likely to be comprised by both its narrow focus on skill
development that fails to regulate other important employment practices
and cost-based commissioning that militates more generally against robust
employment practice. Policy-makers must address these tensions if work-
force policy is to succeed in creating a high-skilled workforce capable of
delivering high quality care. These are important issues not just in England
but internationally given the global growth in elderly populations and the
long-term elder care challenges being experienced in NPM-driven liberal
market economies across the world (e.g., Broadbent, 2014; Nisbet, 2017).
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